Paying taxes in Euro area countries: issues behind tax morale by Rutkauskas, Virgilijus
www.ssoar.info
Paying taxes in Euro area countries: issues behind
tax morale
Rutkauskas, Virgilijus
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Rutkauskas, V. (2016). Paying taxes in Euro area countries: issues behind tax morale. Torun Business Review, 15(3),
5-21. https://doi.org/10.19197/tbr.v15i3.56
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Torun Business Review 15(3) 2016 5-21 
5 
 
 
PAYING TAXES  
IN EURO ZONE COUNTRIES:  
ISSUES BEHIND TAX MORALE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Payment of taxes is an agreement among taxpayers and the state. Taxpayers commit to 
pay taxes and the state provides public goods and security that otherwise would not be 
available in market economy. However, the universal aversion to tax theory contradicts 
the previous statement in a way that every rational economic agent will tend to increase 
its wellbeing by reducing tax payments and seeking public benefits. Practical outcomes 
support this statement: for instance, 90% of public income is raised from tax 
contributions, but at the same time, uncollected taxes constitute nearly one-fifth. 
Therefore, attention to the practical and theoretical examination of additional factors 
that have the most pronounced influence to tax payment is growing. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article investigates theoretical and practical as-
pects of tax morale in Euro zone countries. The attitude 
of households on tax payment – whether to pay taxes or 
not – is assessed quantitatively by employing dichoto-
mous logit-probit regression analysis. Research is based 
on household level data received from World Values 
Survey and European Values Study. The results suggest 
that the main issues behind weak tax morale are corrup-
tion and disrespect of the country. Additionally, tax morale 
is significantly affected by such factors as age, gender, 
religiosity, income and education. Article concludes on 
possible policy options in order to increase tax morale. 
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However, the underlying decisions whether to pay taxes or not is based on cost-
benefit analysis. Usually two main indicators – tax base and tax ratio – are unable to 
fully and comprehensively explain changes in tax payments, suggesting the existence of 
other explanatory variables. This is the reason behind growing attention to the 
alternative factors, which could uncover deeper factors under unwillingness to pay 
taxes more accurately. The main drawback of such research approach is lack of suitable 
data sources. Usually assessments of tax evasion are based on data provided by surveys, 
experiments, or laboratory outcomes. This could give another loath outcome: in some 
occasions, it could be hard to expect honest answers to questions that carry a criminal 
threat. 
The aim of this paper is to disclose factors affecting unwillingness to pay taxes in 
separate countries of Euro zone. The analysis is based on the data provided by World 
Values Survey and European Values Study. Data received from these surveys are 
quantitatively assessed by employing dichotomous logit-probit regression models. Most 
significant factors behind the unwillingness to pay taxes are revealed and described 
separately for each of the 19 countries in the Euro zone. The results of this paper are 
beneficial for the practitioners, because public authorities could direct their efforts 
more precisely in order to increase tax compliance. Moreover, the results of this paper 
enrich academia’s views on alternative factors underlying the taxpayers’ decisions that 
can be used as guidelines for further research. The summary of the paper includes  
a suggestion on policy measures that could be helpful to increase tax compliance.  
Without the introduction and conclusions, this paper consists of the three main 
sections. The second section reveals the importance of taxes in contemporary economy 
and the magnitude of tax evasion. The third section deals with main factors underlying 
the tax morale, which are discovered in the existing literature. The fourth section is 
a quantitative assessment of tax morale in 19 Euro zone countries with the results 
thereof presented. Some ideas that are provided in this paper have, to some extent, 
been published by other authors (Rutkauskas V., Ivaškaitė-Tamošiūnė, V. 2015: 
Vengimas mokėti mokesčius ir jo vertinimas Baltijos šalyse), however, this article 
presents a much broader and deeper assessment of tax morale questions.  
 
 
ECONOMIC MEANING OF TAXATION  
 
Taxes are affecting economy and behavior of taxpayers in different ways. As Levine-
Schayowitz (2005) presents, when governments raise taxes, people alter their behaviors 
and make decisions they would not make otherwise. This suggests that when the 
behavior of private citizens is affected by a tax, the allocation of resources changes as 
well. Because taxes raise the prices buyers pay, providing incentives to consume less, 
and lower the prices sellers receive, providing incentives to produce less, the size of the 
market shrinks below its optimum level in the sense that revenues raised by 
government taxation may be less than the distorting market outcomes. Therefore, to 
better understand the impact of taxation on behavior, it is necessary to take into 
account how taxes influence the prices consumers pay, the quantities consumers 
demand, and the resulting tax revenues raised. Changes in tax policies also affect 
decisions to participate in the labor market, choice of occupation, tax avoidance 
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schemes and the degree of tax evasion activities through participation in the formal or 
informal sector of the economy. 
Taxes constitute the main part of public sector income in modern economies (see 
Figure 1). Usually, changes in tax collection determine whether the government is 
running budget surplus or deficit. If the public sector has more income and savings than 
expenditures, public spending on consumption and investment increases without 
building up debt. This makes positive contribution to the general economy because 
public spending increases ceteris paribus aggregate demand. If public expenditure 
remains high for a longer period, the widening gap between income and expenditures 
needs to be covered by borrowed funds or decrease in reserves (if a country has the 
reserves). Both outcomes are generally unwelcome, because the growth of debt means 
an increase in debt burden for future generations and usually it is a leading indicator of 
future tax increases as it is proposed by Ricardo – De Viti – Barro equivalence theorem. 
Thus, economic agents’ decisions whether to pay taxes or not, ultimately have a direct 
impact on them as tax payments are directly interlinked with the provision of public 
goods and services and the indebtedness of public sector. 
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Figure 1. Government revenue sources in 2014 
Sources: Eurostat and author’s calculations. 
 
Budget deficit is a common issue in the public sector in the aftermath of financial 
or economic crises. The main reason for the deficit is an increase in public sector ex-
penditures in order to support a faster economic recovery. Such view was presented by 
J. M. Keynes in times of the Great Depression. However, it could be added (Rutkauskas 
2015) that public borrowing following the economic downturn is a consequence of the 
usually enormous generation of private debt prior the bust. Greater flows of consump-
tion and investment during the boom phase support faster growth and put the economy 
on a new – higher – level. When economic downturn starts, a simultaneous drop in 
borrowing and consumption and investment of private sector results in a new – lower – 
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GDP level. To keep economy close to the previous equilibrium, the same level of funding 
is required; however, the private sector tends to save rather than consume more in bust 
periods. The crucial role in terms of automatic stabilizers and general expenditures is 
played by the public sector that behaves like a substitute for a drop in private sector 
expenditures (where the National Accounts consumption (C) and investment (I) are 
substituted by government expenditure (G)).  
In many countries, the differences between theoretically calculated and collected 
tax income are noticeable. A UK research suggests that in 2012 – 2013, the gap between 
theoretically calculated and collected tax income constituted 6.8% (HMRC 2014). Similar 
figures for the EU in 2009 were 22.1%. For every year, uncollected taxes in the region are 
reaching approximately EUR 1 billion. According to Murphy (2012), the main reason 
behind this phenomenon is a significantly large shadow economy. Moreover, reverse 
calculations show that public sector debt could be repaid in 9 years (based on the 2009 
data) if all taxes had been paid as they were supposed to. Assessment of the gap between 
theoretically calculated and practically collected Value Added Tax in the EU suggests 
that in 2011, the gap constituted 18% or 1.5% of GDP. The highest measure was in Roma-
nia, Latvia, Greece, and Lithuania (CPB 2013). Thereby shadow economy and corruption 
in these countries are suggested to be among the highest in the EU (see Schneider 2013 
and EC 2014). The unwillingness to pay taxes negatively affects economies and house-
hold welfare and prevents the decrease of social exclusion, because insufficient collect-
ing of public income in terms of taxes results in an inability to provide sufficient public 
goods and security.  
The factors affecting collection of public sector’s income and balancing the budget 
are important to secure fulfillment of the contract between the public and private sec-
tors. Thus, the tax base, tax rates and taxation systems in general are and will be the 
subject of interest in searching for the most efficient taxation model or a policy that 
enables the state to maximize the public income. A classic taxation model suggests look-
ing at the taxpayer as a decision maker whose aim is to maximize benefit. Thus, before 
paying taxes, the economic agent performs a cost and benefit analysis and looks for two 
possible options. One of them is not to pay taxes and pay a fine if audited by tax au-
thorities, and the second – to pay taxes. However, a number of unanswered questions 
remains. For instance, why economic agents tend to pay taxes and why not; what are 
the main factors behind their decisions; how these factors could be influenced; what 
role could be played by the government; etc. Based on this, the increasing numbers of 
researchers are looking for ways to explain the so-called “soft factors” – other than tax 
base and rate – behind taxpayers’ behavior. 
 
 
FACTORS BEHIND TAX COLLECTION 
 
In the contemporary economic theory, payment of taxes is a bilateral agreement be-
tween an economic agent and the state, because the latter is basically founded on pre-
cisely this way of funding. Economic agents agree to pay taxes to the state to receive 
specific goods and security in return. At the same time, economic agents are rational 
seekers of cost-to-benefit situation and will try to avoid or minimize paying taxes while 
simultaneously seeking public goods and security. Samuelson (1954) argued that private 
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provision of public goods would be inefficient and low, because each individual will have 
an incentive to take a “free ride” on the private purchases of others. The theory of gen-
eral reluctance to pay taxes also brings arguments that are contrary to the concept of 
conscious taxpayers’ agreement with the state. Fiscal illusion theory provides that  
a rational economic agent realizes the need to have balanced public finances (the ex-
penditures on public goods and security should not exceed state revenue in a long run). 
Notwithstanding, a rational economic agent tends to seek financial benefits from the 
state while avoiding paying for public goods and services via taxes. Thus, this behavior is 
assessed as irrational. 
The public sector uses legal powers to force economic agents give up part of their 
income or wellbeing via taxes. There are three possible ways to deal with taxation: 1) 
agree to pay taxes; 2) evade taxes; 3) avoid taxes. Agreement to pay taxes is not the aim 
of this research, thus will not be further assessed in this article. Tax evasion and tax 
avoidance have at once similar and different meanings that must be clarified. According 
to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, tax evasion is linked to 
illegal agreements among parties in order to conceal taxable income or elude fulfilment 
of tax liabilities. On the other hand, tax avoidance is linked to searching for legal factors 
enabling the taxpayer to lower tax payments (OECD 2015). For the purpose of this arti-
cle, differences between tax evasion and tax avoidance are not that important, as what’s 
under scrutiny is the result of general unwillingness to pay taxes and not the its type 
(evasion or avoidance). By taking this into account, in the scope of this article, tax eva-
sion and tax avoidance have been treated as synonyms.  
The most famous income tax avoidance model was presented in 1972 by M. Alling-
ham and A. Sandmo. Their research was based on G. S. Becker “Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach.” In his paper, G. S. Becker proposes to look at the tax payment 
as the optimal portfolio formation exercise, where the taxpayer rather chooses to take 
risky position and not pay taxes, but faces a possibility to be audited by tax authority. 
On the other hand, a taxpayer can choose a safe portfolio and pay taxes as it is stated in 
applicable laws. S. Yitzhaki (1974) complemented the model with a fine added if the fact 
of tax evasion is detected. Such an approach allows investigating the sensitivity of tax-
payer’s behavior to factors like a possibility to be audited, fines, tax rate, etc. However, 
this model gets some critique, which is acknowledged by authors. The weakest point is 
the assumption that a taxpayer receives benefits only by avoiding paying taxes, because 
the classic model does not take into accounts the economic goods and services that are 
provided by the state. Thus, the only rational outcome in this case would be to avoid 
paying taxes and getting a free ride as it is suggested by Samuelson (1954). This draw-
back is well perceived by the authors, however, because of its simplicity, it is commonly 
used to explain the unwillingness to pay taxes.  
Therefore, why are people paying taxes? This question has been raised by J. Alm et 
al. (1992) and the results of their experiment suggest that compliance occurs, because 
some individuals weight a low probability of audit, although such weighing is not uni-
versal. Compliance does not occur simply because individuals believe that evasion is 
wrong, since the behavior is unchanged by the use of either neutral or loaded terms. 
Moreover, there is evidence that individuals pay taxes because they value the public 
goods that their taxes finance. An increase in the amount that individuals receive from  
a given tax payment increases their compliance rate. At this stage, it should be noted 
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that individuals exhibit a remarkable diversity in their behavior. They sometimes appear 
to be weighted with low probabilities, sometimes they appear to be risk-seeking, on 
occasion they are cooperative and at other times they are freeloaders (for instance, 
Figure 2 presents a positive relation between the unwillingness to pay taxes and claim-
ing state benefits and supports the idea of irrational behavior of households). 
 
Figure 2. Relation between cheating on tax and claiming state benefits 
Sources: European Value Study (2008) and author’s calculations. 
Note: growth in number represents greater justification. 
 
Recent research results in tax payment field recognize that models like M. Alling-
ham’s and A. Sandmo’s lack the explanatory power on some occasions. It is suggested 
that behavioral economics theory could add more realistic factors to the classic model, 
such as psychological comfort, the prestige of paying taxes and others. Daude et al. 
(2012) explain that tax morale is based on the aspiration to be honest with the state and 
other taxpayers and trust the government. On the contrary, dishonesty and distrust 
towards government are directly linked to tax evasion. For instance, a poor quality of 
public goods could be perceived by taxpayer as a dishonest behavior by the authorities 
and thus result in the unwillingness to buy public goods by avoiding tax payment. T. O. 
Weber et al (2014) claim that the main challenge when investigating the tax morale is the 
criminal background of such activity. Models and field experiments confirm the positive 
relation between the quality of public goods and willingness to pay taxes. In addition, 
correlation is found of tax payment and social norms like belonging to a social group or 
a country, patriotism and justice. Field experiments confirm that relations between 
taxpayers and tax collectors as robbers vs cops do not encourage paying taxes, therefore 
should be avoided. 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PAYING TAXES 
 
Among a number of issues that are challenging the assessment of tax avoidance, are 
criminal consequences of such activity. As a result, researchers find a scarcity of data in 
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the field of tax morale. Two of the commonly used data sources are World Values Survey 
(WVS) and European Values Study (EVS). These globally performed regular surveys in-
vestigate respondents’ opinion in different fields like living conditions, family, religion, 
society, policy, economy, etc. Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2005), Alm and Torgler 
(2006), Torgler and Schneider (2006), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) have used WVS 
and EVS data for investigating tendencies in the willingness to pay taxes and other indi-
cators. WVS and WVS are based on the common methodology, thus data are comparable 
in terms of time and countries. 
Dependent variables for analyzing individual answers to the question “Cheating on 
taxes if you have a chance” are possible answers varying from 1 (“never)” to 10 (“al-
ways”). Taking into account that answer data are categorical variables according to Gu-
jarati (2004) a simple linear regression is not suitable and instead the logit-probit re-
gression model should be used. Moreover, such an approach is supported by a number 
of researchers in the tax morale field. A summary of the previously made researches in 
tax morale field (Table 1) shows that the main independent variables are age, gender, 
religiosity, employment, marital status, trust in public institutions and democracy. 
 
Table 1. Quantitative assessment of factors behind the tax morale 
Reference 
Sample and econo-
metrics 
Tested variables Significant variables 
B. Torgler 
(2005) 
Switzerland. Data 
from the ISSP. Year 
1998. Weighted or-
dered probit estima-
tion 
Gender, age, marital 
status, education, em-
ployment status, personal 
income, church attend-
ance, direct democracy, 
trust in court and legal 
system, tax rate, fine rate 
and audit probability, 
culture variables (lan-
guage dummy variables) 
 
Education (+) 
Students and pension-
ers (+) 
Trust in court and 
legal system (+) 
Religiosity (+) 
Democracy (direct) (+) 
J. Mar-
tínez-
Vázquez, B. 
Torgler 
(2005) 
Spain. Data from WVS 
and EVS. Years 1981, 
1990, 1995 and 
1999/2000. Weighted 
ordered probit esti-
mation. 
Gender, age, marital 
status, employment 
status, religiosity, trust 
in the parliament, the 
national pride, time 
dummy variables 
Tax morale is stronger 
in the 90’s than in the 
80’s 
Age and religiousness 
(+) 
Upper-class individu-
als (–) 
Trust in the parlia-
ment and the national 
pride (+) 
 
J. Prieto et 
al. (2006) 
Spain. Data from the 
ISSP. Year 1998 
Gender, age, marital 
status, education, self-
employed, social class, 
size of municipality of 
residence, voted political 
party 
 
Age (+) 
Self-employed (–) 
Voters to nation–wide 
parties (+) 
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B. Torgler, 
F. G. 
Schneider 
(2006) 
Spain, Switzerland 
and Belgium. Data 
from the WVS (1995-
97) and the EVS (1999-
2000). Weighted or-
dered probit estima-
tion 
Gender, age, marital 
status, education, em-
ployment status, social 
class, personal income, 
church attendance, 
direct democracy, the 
national pride, trust in 
political institutions and 
government, attitude 
towards democracy, 
personal income tax 
rate, fine rate and audit 
probability (for Switzer-
land), culture variables 
(regional and language 
dummy variables). 
 
Cultural and regional 
differences affect tax 
morale in both Swit-
zerland and Spain 
Trust in legal system, 
government, and 
parliament, the na-
tional pride, and pro-
democratic attitudes 
(+) 
Religiosity (Belgium 
and Switzerland) (+) 
Direct democracy 
(Switzerland) (+) 
Women (+) 
B. Torgler 
(2006) 
32 world countries 
(mainly EU). Data 
from the WVS (1995-
1997). Weighted or-
dered probit estima-
tion 
Gender, age, marital 
status, education, em-
ployment status, social 
class, financial situation, 
risk aversion, religiosity 
(church attendance, 
religious education, 
active in church group, 
importance of religion, 
religious guidance, trust 
church), corruption, 
trustworthiness 
Religiosity (+) 
Age (+) 
Risk aversion (+) 
Upper-class individu-
als (–) 
Financial satisfaction 
(+) 
Retired, home work-
ers, and part time 
employed (+) 
Women (+) 
Married (+) 
Living together (–) 
Education (–) 
Trustworthiness (+) 
Perceived corruption 
(–) 
 
J. Alm, B. 
Torgler 
(2006) 
USA and Spain. Data 
from the WVS. 1999-
2000. Common cross-
country slopes are 
imposed. Weighted 
ordered probit esti-
mation 
 
Gender, age, marital 
status, education, em-
ployment status, church 
attendance, trust in 
parliament, country 
dummy variables 
Tax morale is lower in 
Spain than in the USA 
Age (+) 
Religiosity (+) 
Women (+) 
Married (+) 
J. Alm, B. 
Torgler 
(2006) 
16 EU countries. Data 
from the WVS (1990-
93). Common cross-
country slopes are 
imposed. Weighted 
ordered probit esti-
mation 
 
Gender, age, marital 
status, employment 
status, church attend-
ance, country dummy 
variables 
Age (+) 
Religiosity (+) 
Self-employed (+) 
Pensioners (+) 
Married (+) 
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R. G. 
Cummings 
et al. (2007) 
Botswana (1999) and 
South Africa (2000). 
Data from Afroba-
rometer. Common 
cross-country slopes 
are imposed. Ordered 
probit estimation 
 
Gender, age, education, 
employment status, 
country dummy varia-
bles 
Age (+) 
Sources: author based on Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010). 
 
For the researchers in tax morale field, it is common to use dichotomous (binary) 
instead of multinomial logit-probit regressions. According to Torgler and Schneider 
(2006), the main reason is the lack of depended categorical indicators to perform relia-
ble analysis. In order to explain the main factors behind taxpayers’ behavior for every 
combination of variables, at least 20% of opposite indicators should appear (the same 
rule is applied in other types of logit-probit regressions). Otherwise the explanatory 
power of the model decreases sharply. However, some categories lack data to ensure 
this 20% rule, thus it is common to use dichotomous instead of multinomial logit-probit 
regressions (or putting it differently: use two possible answers to a question rather than 
ten). On the one hand, this ensures explanatory power of the model, on the other, the 
data received from WVS and EVS are based on surveys, thus on the opinions of the re-
spondents and not on the factual data. This is especially important to tax morale re-
searches as the object contains criminal activity. 
Research of tax morale factors in Euro zone countries is based on WVS and EVS 
data. 86 surveys of individual households in all 19 Euro zone countries were conducted 
between 1981 and 2013. The most researched country, with eight surveys in the above-
mentioned period is Spain and the least – Greece and Luxembourg. Data received for 
every single country have been assessed separately by applying dichotomous logit-
probit regression analysis. Ten independent variables (based on the results from earlier 
researches shown in Table 1) and one dependent variable have been adopted to investi-
gate the importance of different factors to tax morale for every single Euro zone coun-
try and 3-6 are selected as significant. The significance of independent variables is 
based primarily on the measure of p-value. The suitability of the whole model is as-
sessed not by coefficient of determination as it is common for linear regressions, but by 
the share of classified cases (a case in this research is equal to one individual answer). 
The case is assessed as classified, when the results received by the model are the same 
as actually collected during the survey. As Gujarati (2004) suggests, more than 50% of 
classified cases by the model, allow assessing the model as suitable.  
Moreover, independent model variables are assessed according to the odds ratio. 
Odds ratio is a specific ratio for logit-probit models and shows how a dependent varia-
ble (in this case cheating on taxes if you have a chance) could change if one of independ-
ent variables increases by 1 and all the others will remain unchanged. Odds ratio is de-
fined as the ratio of the probability of success P(Y=1) and failure P(Y=0) or 
P(Y=1)/P(Y=0). This ratio is assumed as the main ratio in assessing the importance of 
independent variables while assessing dependent ones. The value of odds ratio could 
vary from close to 0 (if the probability of failure is approaching 100) to infinity (if the 
probability of success is approaching 100).  
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When analyzing dependent variables, it is important to observe whether the value 
of independent variable odds ratio is below or above 1. If the odds ratio is 1, the proba-
bilities of success and failure are equal to 0.5. The growth of value of an independent 
variable by 1 with odds ratio below 1 means that the dependent variable has a higher 
probability of success (P(Y=1)) than failure (P(Y=0)). On the contrary, a growth of value of 
an independent variable by 1 with the odds ratio above 1 means that the dependent 
variable has a lower probability of success (P(Y=1)) than failure (P(Y=0)). Table 2 presents 
the results of logit-probit regression analysis for each country and delivered odds rati-
os. Take, for example, of the most covered country in the research period, namely, 
Spain. The eight logit-probit equations show that the most important variable effecting 
cheating on taxes is acceptance of bribe, the national proud, religiosity and age. On the 
average, the odds ratio for an independent “acceptance of bribe” variable is equal to 2.5, 
meaning that if the respondent’s attitude to the acceptance of bribe is greater by 1, the 
ceteris paribus probability that this person will cheat on taxes (P(Y=1)) is equal to 0.71 as 
the probability of not to cheat (P(Y=1)) is equal to 0.29 (remember, that odds ratio is 
P(Y=1)/P(Y=0) or 0.71/0.29 that is close to 2.5). 
 
Table 2. Variation of most important odds ratio factors 
Country 
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Austria   1.2    1.2  1.3-1.6 1.9-2.5 
Belgium 0.6-0.8       1.3 1.3 1.3-1.4 
Cyprus     0.9-1.1  1.2  1.2-1.4 2.6-4.5 
Estonia 0.6-0.8 1.0       1.2-1.4 1.5-7.0 
Finland 0.5-0.7 1.0     1.2-1.6   1.9-2.3 
France 0.6-0.7 1.0       1.2-1.5 1.3-1.5 
Germany  1.0   0.9-1.1    1.2-1.5 1.4-3.0 
Greece         1.2 1.5-2.0 
Ireland 0.6-0.7 1.0       1.4-1.8 1.7-2.3 
Italy  1.0       1.2-1.3 1.2-2.8 
Latvia 0.7 1.0       1.1-1.3 1.5-2.0 
Lithuania  1.0    0.9-1.1   1.3-1.5 1.3-2.8 
Luxem-
bourg 
   1.2-1.3      1.4-1.8 
Malta       1.4-2.2   2.3-5.7 
Netherlands 0.6-0.8 1.0        1.6-3.4 
Portugal  1.0     1.2   1.3-3.2 
Slovakia  1.0       1.1-1.5 1.4-2.2 
Slovenia 0.6-0.8 1.0       1.2-1.5 2-10 
Spain  1.0     1.2-1.3  1.2-1.5 1.7-3.3 
* Odds ratio for age is 0.94-0.99. 
Source: author’s calculations. 
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Surveys in Austria were conducted in 1990, 1999 and 2008. The main factors behind 
tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are perception 
of corruption, the national pride, religion and marital status (Table 2). All these factors 
are statistically significant (the only exception is the national pride factor in 2008, where 
p-value reached 0.12) wherein it ensures 69-72% of positive cases by the models. Based 
on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of 
corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try to 
evade paying taxes. The case of Austria suggests that citizens who feel less national 
pride will tend to evade taxes more, as it is the case with religiosity. Moreover, unmar-
ried (single) persons are less likely to avoid taxes.  
Surveys in Belgium were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2009. The main factors 
behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are 
gender, the national pride, trust in parliament and the perception of corruption (Table 
2). All these factors are statistically significant (based on p-value) and ensure 66-71% of 
positive cases by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind 
tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept 
a bribe, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Belgium suggests that 
citizens who feel less national pride or less trust in parliament will tend to evade taxes 
more. Moreover, men are more probable to avoid taxes than women in Belgium. 
Surveys in Cyprus were conducted in 2006, 2008 and 2011. The main factors behind 
tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are perception 
of corruption, the national pride, religion and employment status Table 2). Not all fac-
tors are statistically significant for Cyprus, however, they all have been kept in the mod-
el to ensure consistency in years and substantial share of positive cases (79-90%). Based 
on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of 
corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try to 
evade paying taxes. The case of Cyprus suggests that citizens who feel less national 
pride will tend to evade taxes more, as is the case with religiosity.  
Surveys in Estonia were conducted in 1990, 1996, 1999, 2008 and 2011. The main 
factors behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis 
are perception of corruption, the national pride, religion and marital status (Table 2). All 
these factors are statistically significant and ensure 66-76% of positive cases by the 
models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the 
perception of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more 
one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Estonia suggests that citizens who feel 
less national pride will tend to evade taxes more. Moreover, male and younger persons 
are more probable to avoid taxes. 
Surveys in Finland were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009. The 
main factors behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis are perception of corruption, age, gender, and religion (Table 2). All these fac-
tors are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 66-70% of positive 
cases by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax 
evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept  
a bribe, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Finland suggests that 
more religious citizens tend to evade taxes less. Moreover, women and older persons 
are less likely to avoid taxes in Finland. 
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Surveys in France were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999, 2006 and 2008. The main 
factors behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis 
are perception of corruption, age, gender, and the national pride (Table 2). All these 
factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 66-70% of positive 
cases by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax 
evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept  
a bribe, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of France suggests that 
with more national pride, people tend to evade taxes less. Moreover, women and older 
persons are less likely to avoid paying taxes. 
Surveys in Germany were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2006, 2008 and 2013. 
The latest survey is not suitable for this research, because there were no data on the 
dependent variable, thus the summary of results below is given only for six surveys. The 
main factors behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis are perception of corruption, age, status of employment, and the national pride 
(Table 2). All these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 
67-76% of positive cases by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant 
factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will be 
willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. Close to the odds 
ratio of perception of corruption in Germany is the national pride – the more a person 
feels the national pride, the more he/she will pay taxes. The case of Germany suggests 
that unemployed persons or those with lower salaries will tend to evade taxes less. 
Moreover, older persons are less likely to avoid taxes.  
Surveys in Greece were conducted in 1999 and 2008. The main factors behind tax 
evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are perception of 
corruption and the national pride (Table 2). All these factors are statistically significant 
(with exception for the national pride in 1999 as p-value exceeds 0.05 threshold) and 
ensure 65-77% of positive cases by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most signifi-
cant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person is 
willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. Moreover, the case 
of Greece suggests that persons who feel a higher national pride will tend to avoid 
cheating on taxes more. 
Surveys in Ireland were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. The main factors 
behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are 
perception of corruption, age, gender, and the national pride (Table 2). All these factors 
are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 66-70% of positive cases 
by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is 
the perception of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the 
more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Ireland suggests that the more citi-
zens feel the national pride, they will tend to evade taxes less. Moreover, women and 
older persons are less likely to avoid taxes. 
Surveys in Italy were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999, 2005 and 2008. The main fac-
tors behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis 
are perception of corruption, age, and national proud (Table 2). All these factors are 
statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 65-72% of positive cases by 
the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the 
perception of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more 
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one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Italy suggests that citizens with a greater 
national pride tend to evade paying taxes less. Moreover, older persons are less likely to 
avoid taxes. 
Surveys in Latvia were conducted in 1990, 1996, 1999 and 2008. The main factors 
behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are 
perception of corruption, age, gender and the national pride (Table 2). All these factors 
are statistically significant (with exception of one year’s model for the national pride 
indicator) as measured by p-value and ensure 70-76% of positive cases by the models. 
Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception 
of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try 
to evade paying taxes. The case of Latvia suggests a more successful tax collection from 
persons who feel a greater national pride. Moreover, women and older persons are less 
likely to avoid taxes. 
Surveys in Lithuania were conducted in 1990, 1997, 1999 and 2008. The main factors 
behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are 
perception of corruption, age, income and the national pride (Table 2). All these factors 
are statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 65-74% of positive cases 
by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is 
the perception of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the 
more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Lithuania suggests that the national 
pride plays a significant role in citizens in making a decision to pay taxes or not: a high-
er national pride is directly linked to stronger tax payments. Moreover, persons with 
higher income tend to avoid taxes more. 
Surveys in Luxembourg were conducted in 1999 and 2008. The main factors behind 
tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are perception 
of corruption and the level of education (Table 2). All these factors are statistically sig-
nificant as measured by p-value and ensure 60-67% of positive cases by the models. 
Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception 
of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try 
to evade paying taxes. The case of Luxembourg suggests that tax evasion increases in 
line with the increase of education level. 
Surveys in Malta were conducted in 1983, 1991, 1999 and 2008. The main factors be-
hind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are per-
ception of corruption and religion (Table 2). All these factors are statistically significant 
as measured by p-value and ensure 83-86% of positive cases by the models. Based on 
the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of cor-
ruption – the more a person will be willing to accept bribe, the more one will try to 
evade paying taxes. The case of Malta suggests that more religious citizens tend to evade 
taxes less.  
Surveys in the Netherlands were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999, 2006, 2008 and 2012. 
The main factors behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regres-
sion analysis are perception of corruption, age and gender (Table 2). All these factors are 
statistically significant as measured by p-value and ensure 63-74% of positive cases by 
the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the 
perception of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more 
one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Netherlands suggests that older citizens 
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will tend to evade taxes less (however, the last survey showed slightly opposite esti-
mates). Moreover, women tend to avoid taxes less.  
Surveys in Portugal were conducted in 1990, 1999 and 2008. The main factors be-
hind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are per-
ception of corruption, age and religiosity (Table 2). All these factors are statistically 
significant as measured by p-value (except for the age in the last survey) and ensure  
61-79% of positive cases by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant 
factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will be 
willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Portu-
gal suggests that more religious and older people tend to avoid taxes less. 
Surveys in Slovakia were conducted in 1991, 1998, 1999 and 2008. The main factors 
behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis are 
perception of corruption, age and the national pride (Table 2). All these factors are sta-
tistically significant as measured by p-value (except age for the first survey) and ensure 
64-76% of positive cases by the models. Based on the odds ratio, the most significant 
factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption – the more a person will be 
willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try to evade paying taxes. The case of Portu-
gal suggests that older people and those who feel a greater national pride tend to avoid 
taxes less. 
Surveys in Slovenia were conducted in 1992, 1996, 1999, 2005, 2008 and 2011. The 
main factors behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit regression 
analysis are perception of corruption, gender, age and the national pride (Table 2). All 
these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value (except gender for the 
fourth survey) and ensure 68-86% of positive cases by the models. Based on the odds 
ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception of corruption  
– the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try to evade 
paying taxes. The case of Slovenia suggests that women, older people and those who feel 
a greater national pride tend to avoid taxes less. 
Surveys in Spain were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2007, 2008 and 
2011. The main factors behind tax evasion as suggested by dichotomous logit-probit 
regression analysis are perception of corruption, age, religiosity and the national pride 
(Table 2). All these factors are statistically significant as measured by p-value (except 
religiosity for the fourth survey) and ensure 65-80% of positive cases by the models. 
Based on the odds ratio, the most significant factor behind tax evasion is the perception 
of corruption – the more a person will be willing to accept a bribe, the more one will try 
to evade paying taxes. The case of Spain suggests that older, more religious citizens and 
those who feel a greater national pride tend to avoid taxes less.  
These empirically assessed variables of tax morale in Euro zone countries are 
guidelines for tax authorities in particular and public sector in general for seeking to 
increase tax collection. As the robust results of this research suggest (all regressions 
have more than 50% of positive cases) the main efforts in order to increase tax collection 
should be directed to fight corruption and foster the national pride. More efforts of 
national authorities investigating tax evasion should be given to men and younger citi-
zens. Additionally, highly educated persons and those with a higher income tend to 
evade taxes more; however, this has been evidenced only for some of countries under 
investigation. Moreover, religiosity is closely linked to the proper payment of taxes.  
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According to Weber (2014), tax morale could be increased by signing a “taxpayers 
honor code” as this in general will increase the dependence on society (thus the national 
pride). Trust in government and tax authority plays noticeable role for tax morale, thus 
the image of public institutions should find place in the agenda. Moreover, quality of 
public goods is not the least important to be considered while making decisions to pay 
taxes or not, thus the quality of goods as well as quality of the institutions themselves 
should be constantly monitored and increased (in part it is linked to corruption). Weber 
(2014) continues that public institutions with reputation of coercive mechanism should 
find the way to earn the reputation of high quality service providers. E. F. Luttmer and 
M. Singhal (2014) add that cooperation between the state and individual taxpayer in-
creases the tax morale and dependency on the group and cultural effects, which in the 
long, run could lead to a higher tax compliance. Also, for tax authorities, it should be 
important to investigate more deeply the taxpayers who are younger and male, with  
a higher education and a higher income. As this research suggests and as other authors 
confirm, payment of taxes could be increased not only by applying pressure on taxpay-
ers, but also by employing soft measures. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The main share of public sector income is based on tax contributions. However, rational 
economic agents tend simultaneously to avoid tax payments and consume public goods, 
thus free-riding on public goods and services. According to different research types, 
unpaid taxes constitute nearly one-fifth of all tax income receivables, causing 
imbalances in state budget, debt accumulation and even busts of the entire countries. 
Classic models of unwillingness to pay taxes are not always able to explain the factors 
behind the weak tax morale as taxation rates and a lack of basic explanatory power to 
derive proper conclusions. Thus, the gap in this field is filled with alternative methods 
suggested by tax morale research and in this paper is assessed quantitatively by 
employing dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis. 
The results of tax morale analysis in all 19 Euro zone countries suggest that the 
main factors behind weak tax payment are corruption and a low national pride. More 
efforts of national authorities while investigating tax evasion should be given to men 
and taxpayers of younger age. Additionally, more educated persons and those with  
a higher income tend to evade taxes more; however, this has been evidenced only for 
some of countries under investigation. In addition, religiosity has a direct and strong 
positive link (especially in some countries) to the willingness to pay taxes. Based on the 
results of this research, it could be confirmed that the main factor behind a weak tax 
morale in Euro zone is corruption, which additionally is closely interlinked with the 
shadow economy. Moreover, this suggests that the willingness to pay taxes is 
conceptually a broader issue to be investigated and assessed.  
Systematic assessment of factors behind a weak tax payment should form 
guidelines for public authorities to create a stronger tax morale and tax collection in the 
country. Different measures like taxpayer honor code, better quality of public goods, 
greater trust in state, patriotism and feeling of community should be employed in order 
to increase the tax morale. After employing different measures, the public sector could 
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expect closing the gap between the actual and planed tax collection, thus ensuring  
a better standing of public finance and the ability to provide goods and services. 
Moreover, this could be done without changing tax rates or taxation base as empirical 
analysis suggest the existence of negative correlation between the tax payment gap and 
taxes collected. 
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